Part One

Truth emerges more readily from error than confusion: Francis Bacon’s dictum is a useful companion as we begin to assess future directions for The International Society for Panetics. In the following limited analysis of Johan Galtung’s Ralph Siu Memorial Lecture, "Panetics and the Practice of Peace and Development", I use Bacon’s cautionary words to aid this assessment process.

The presence of an extraordinary leader like Ralph Siu cannot help but affect organizational direction, philosophy and perspective. Conversely, the loss of such a leader must have similar consequences. Ralph’s persona was a rare combination of erudition, sincerity, empathy, warmth and charm. With our loss of Ralph, it is natural that new perceptions and new thoughts will surface as the question of "Whither Now?" is logically asked of ISP's future. Some may no doubt question some past directions or move away from earlier preconceptions. Not to expect this would have caused pain to so open, honest and thoughtful a person as Ralph Siu.

Johan Galtung’s paper is a useful platform for an examination of the road map that has thus far guided the development of ISP. This paper basically focuses on three major concerns:

1. The underlying message of what Panetics is all about.

2. The application of Panetics to the practice of peace and development as well as that of law.

3. A melange of issues and targets, from reflections on various articles by Siu, Siu and Stover, the nature of theory versus experience versus ideology, or the imagined (by Galtung) justification of a relatively high level of unemployment by his seeming favorite whipping boys,economists.

I will limit my remarks about Prof. Galtung’s presentation to the first of his concerns--the underlying message of what Panetics is all about. This would, I believe, best serve those who may be in the mode of rethinking or searching for new avenues of development of the Panetics construct.

Galtung’s humorous reference to Ralph’s oft-made remark concerning numerical estimates: "They may be 100 % off, yet the measure will tell us something of immense value" -- is of interest, I believe, for what is not said. Not always, I would remind Ralph when he made that statement in my presence. I would not choose that approach for physicians, pharmacists, auto engine designers or a host of others on whom my safety and future may depend. Ralph always agreed with my riposte along these lines. But as an economist who has done his share of research, I knew what Ralph meant to convey. In any first effort, an intelligent, discriminating analyst will take informed shots in the darkness that usually prevails as--with first, faltering steps--one tests assumptions and hypotheses. But this only works as long as one is ready to re-evaluate, judge and--most importantly--be willing to change as new facts and insights begin to emerge. I believe the necessity for such a mid-course correction is now at hand for Panetics. Galtung’s presentation serves a most useful purpose in aiding us to set the course for some of these needed changes.

Helpfully, he sets the framework for an analysis of the underlying structure of the Panetics construct in a series of five points:

1. Man is the measure of all things.

2. The measure is subjective.

3. The measure is profoundly egalitarian.

4. The measure does not include sukha, bliss, and happiness.

5. The measure is non-theoretical.

I do not see how major exception can be taken to the assumptions underlying the first two points. The word major is used only because I desire to accommodate those who see Man as only a part of a larger schema, which assumes a living system that includes all forms of life, indeed, even the earth itself. But most people will not take exception to the point of view that the condition of Man is what ranks uppermost as we all attempt to exist in some mutually interacting, beneficial manner on this planet. And that each individual owns his or her suffering and is the primary judge of that condition cannot be denied. One’s own suffering can only be assessed and comprehended in its type and intensity by its owner. One’s own suffering--like one’s own teeth--can only be experienced by the owner.

Looking at the next three points is a very different matter. And as I assess each of these fundamental points, I hope to surface a conflict that has long perturbed me regarding the most basic assumptions regarding Panetic principles.

When we say the measure of suffering is egalitarian, we must ask what is meant by egalitarian? It cannot mean each person’s suffering can be given the same weight. To do that must mean:

There are no conditions under which equality is not subject to some generally agreed-upon limitations.

This is nonsense. Even in the most democratic of nations, where each citizen is guaranteed the right to vote, that right is suspended under certain conditions. Convicted felons, medically defined idiots come to mind immediately. The right to a speedy trial is likewise a right that

can be limited under certain conditions. Habeas corpus was suspended by no less a person than Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. Even the most of all cherished rights, one’s own life, is subject to forfeit if certain proscribed conditions of a civilized society are ignored. Contrary to what Prof. Galtung believes: This measure [the dukkha] makes us all equal before the suffering, like before the law. This not quite true of the law, except in some general, theoretical sense.

Equality before the law is an equality that is circumscribed by provisions that guarantee a society’s right to a whole host of what are believed to be necessary exceptions. Conditions of war bring many of these exceptions to the fore. Even during peacetime, service in the U.S. military means being subject to a code of justice different from that imposed on all other citizens.

Equality before the law is always subject to how the legal system defines that state of equality. How any society defines equality must ultimately square with the larger objectives of that society. And how that is determined is usually subject to a majority of a very small number of people (nine in the United States) who have the last word on what the law means. In a Supreme Court decision that is split 5 to 4, one person has had the last word on what is the law!

One of the unresolved issues regarding the dukkha is exactly how to circumscribe this measurement system in order to achieve our objective of not just measuring suffering but lessening suffering. Galtung’s proposition that "My enemy counts like myself" presents a logic of egalitarianism that equates the suffering NATO has inflicted upon Milosevic to the suffering that dictator has imposed on the Kosovars! Unless this is all merely a game of developing an arcane measurement system, there seems to be a moral disconnect in this sort of reasoning, I believe. But what if one accepts the validity of trying to develop an accurate measure of suffering that assumes the validity of "My enemy counts like myself?" I am certain that Milosevic would indeed suggest that the mental anguish and suffering he and his supporters would have to undergo if Kosovo were to remain in the hands of the Muslim residents is at least equal to any claims of suffering claimed by the residents? If there is to be any realistic use of a system that measures the combined suffering of dictators and their victims, how do we objectively separate or weight the two differently? Indeed, how can we do this legitimately if we start from Galtung’s premise "My enemy counts like myself"? We cannot. But more profoundly, should we? This is a question of both personal values and social ethics. My values and the ethical system with which I was inculcated both dictate that there are conditions when we should. Questions of equity, justice and ethics usually call for this differentiation. For an answer to this sort of problem you need go no further than Ralph Siu’s Shaping One’s Own Life. On page 151, he quotes Andrew Akins asking, "Can you imagine how a jury made up of twelve white landowners would judge the merits of our [Indian] claims [to their lands]?"

The question of seeing the enemy as not qualitatively different can be difficult to deal with under some circumstances. Differentiation itself may not be easy. No better case of such an example exists than our own Civil War, when members of the same family might see each other through rifle sights. In other instances, differentiation is far simpler, but not for all persons. This issue arose during World War II. Sweden, Switzerland and a few other nations held themselves aloof from any military involvement in this effort to contain Germany and Japan from their objectives of dominating Europe and Asia. The values systems of those nation’s citizens who supported this position have been subject to much analysis over the years. All that can be said with any authority is that each human being must determine for himself or herself that point at which political principle is chosen over the survival of a large part of humanity and politically free institutions.

This brings to mind the ultimate meaning of an earlier quote by Prof. Galtung: "Man is the measure of all things" -- man in a context of moral and ethical values, not in a context of physical or political values!

In his fourth point, Johan Galtung notes that the Panetic measure does not include any quality of sukkha, or happiness. It is a "pure" measure. Well and good. This is a question of methodological preferences. I have no quibble with this, though I might suggest that there are valid reasons for developing a net measure of suffering. But this is the subject of another paper. What I do find troublesome is Galtung’s fundamental ignorance of what economists see in the measure of per capita growth. He believes this measurement is a balancing or averaging of suffering and happiness. Nothing could be further from the truth!

To begin with, by "per capita growth" it appears that what is being referred to is the annual measurement of growth of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] divided by the total population. This measure tells us only the total dollar value of all goods and services produced in the U.S. per person. This limited measure is useful only as an indicator of economic growth or change in output of products and services sold in the economy. Every textbook I have used in teaching graduate macroeconomics at The American University and The Johns Hopkins University in the last 20 years has gone to great pains in warning students of the many things this measure does not reflect or measure. For example, in a standard text, Understanding Macroeconomics, by Heilbroner and Galbraith, 9th. Ed., Prentice Hall, pp. 188-194, the question of what GDP [or GNP] does not include is emphasized so students will not fall prey to Galtung’s sort of mis-perception. Such important aspects of life as happiness, welfare, use of products or services, quality of output, value of unpaid work [e.g. work of spouses], the fairness of income distribution, etc. are not measured by GDP. It is a measure with very limited, narrow uses that along with other indicators and measures may provide insights to us as we attempt to make difficult decisions as economists, political leaders, business leaders, or individual citizens. Compare it if you will to the use of a thermometer. All a thermometer does is tell you temperature-- nothing about how you feel or how lovely you believe the day to be. But for those important instances when knowing what the temperature is, nothing beats a thermometer.

The fifth and last of the points,describing the underlying structure of the Panetics construct concerns the non-theoretical nature of the measurement system. In the Galtung paper this is the most obscure piece of writing. All that is said is that concrete human beings report suffering, some more than others. The measure does not tell us why.

Then follows the most confusing series of sentences about the causes of suffering related to concrete cases. All of which ends by saying the theory we (We? IPS?) have may itself cause immense suffering. What theory? No theory has really been outlined, insofar as I have been able to discern.

Part Two

What is Panetics Primarily All About?

When one asks this question, would the answer be the dukkha or suffering? If the answer is the dukha, then the emphasis of Panetics must be about a valid unit of measurement. If the answer is about suffering, then the emphasis must be on gaining an insight about a personal, emotional experience. These are two very different--not necessarily mutually exclusive--phenomena.

It often helps to clarify the nature of a problem by placing it in a ridiculous context. For example, can we quantify a Christian’s belief in Christianity by assigning a quantitative measure called a Christo to his or her level of devotion or commitment? If the answer is in the affirmative, could we then take the next step of comparing one person’s total number of Christos to that of another person? Aside from personal values systems, this measure would have to take into account doctrinal differences that impact on such an answer. Are we dealing with a comparison between Lutherans, Episcopalians, Greek Orthodox and Southern Baptists? Answers will abound. Will they be meaningful or useful? Probably not. Misleading? Quite probably.

The Thorny Problem of Measurement

The imagined necessary nexus between numbers and knowledge is a long and-- unfortunately--well-credentialed one. Witness these two respectable evidences of lineage:

"Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." (Inscription above Plato's academy.)

"He is unworthy of the name of man who is ignorant that the diagonal of a square is incommensurate with its side." (Plato quoted in Memorabilia Mathematica, by R. Moritz.)

The question of "How much pain?" poses a very difficult problem for Paneticists. And for those Paneticists who have been trained in physical sciences, it is all the more painful. To use a definition of pain based on a toothache pain-unit is problematical. Depending on an individual’s threshold of pain--which is controlled by bio-chemical characteristics that vary with each individual--each toothache is experientially defined differently by each sufferer. To a large degree, we are trapped by genetics. But this problem of objective measurement need not be crippling in the development of Panetics, I believe. Paneticists will continue to search for increasingly effective techniques and units of measurement that describe the infliction and evidences of pain. Progress will come. But we must also begin to look to other methodological means of developing Panetics into an effective tool for analyzing the infliction and control of pain.

A very substantial body of knowledge and insight has been achieved in the absence of quantitative techniques. The future of Panetics will depend on developing a simultaneous, two track methodological approach. On one track will be continuing efforts to develop a credible--probably limited--source of quantitative data, capable of satisfying some aspects of a quantitative model. On a second track will be a methodology anchored in the use of a values-oriented model. In this respect, Panetics is not unlike some other disciplines. Let us examine three groups of disciplines.

Group I. Most--not all--of the problems of concern to physicists, engineers, chemists and geologists can be addressed by the use of quantitative techniques plus insights and visions that have no quantitative anchor.

Group II. Most of the problems of concern to theologians, counselors, ethicists and lawyers, cannot be addressed largely by quantitative techniques. Values figure heavily in the methodologies employed in these disciplines, and is frankly acknowledged to be the case.

Group III. Most of the problems of concern to economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, historians and anthropologists find quantitative techniques to be of great value, but also often find such techniques to be more cosmetic than substantive or of more limited use than generally supposed. Values are acknowledged to play critical roles in all of these disciplines--though clumsily and often inarticulately in the case of economics.

My point is that perfectly reputable areas of knowledge--whose contributions have radically reduced vast areas of ignorance-- do not always have a satisfactory armamentarium of quantitative techniques or models. Credible anecdotal information, historically derived insights, logic, well-informed opinion are all sources of information and knowledge that have long been looked to successfully as a basis for intelligent decision-making. Taxonomic devices have been of inestimable help to intelligent, perceptive researchers capable of ordering, evaluating, synthesizing and using non-quantitative information in arriving at significant, important results-- and new knowledge.

Suffering is a personal, experiential phenomenon. There is no "pure" measure of suffering that permits comparing one person’s suffering with another person’s. Indeed, depending on many variables, even the same person cannot measure the same type of experience through time on the same objective basis. In war, the death of the first platoon mate will take on a different amount of pain than the second or fifth or tenth--and not necessarily on a decreasing basis. And the difference between those who were friends and those who were not is great. Can an "objective" comparison be made between those who were almost at the same level of friendship? To state the question is to sense the nonsense of the answer.

Suffering is not measurable in a "pure" sense. When Galtung advises "Give priority to those who suffer most" that statement suggests that we can measure such differences with objective certitude and that value-weights that prioritize each person’s self-evaluation of his or her level of suffering can be accepted in some credible, impartial sense. These are hardly realistic assumptions. On page one of his presentation he has unambiguously said, "The single person is the only judge of his/her situation." Quite correct.

From the outset, Panetics has suffered from the self-imposed need to develop an objective measurement system that is both pure and egalitarian though obviously subjective and unknowable, indeed, unfathomable to other than the immediate person involved. This is reflected in Galtung’s schizoid efforts to untie this same Gordian knot.

Lacking this scientific capability, in what way can the Panetic approach contribute to an understanding and alleviation of suffering? By viewing Panetics as a personal tool for evaluating ex ante the myriad effects of our contemplated decisions as they reflect our personal values. As they create happiness or suffering.

In the work in which I have been engaged since 1980, I have been concerned with the relationship between personal values systems and the decision-making process, which I term decisioning. As an economist, my major focus has been on the impact of personal values and decisions having to do with economic matters--of a public as well as a private sector nature. I, however, have done much work analyzing how personal values have played out in decisioning in other fields as well--the military, law, education, science, and industry. Regardless of the field, the same nexus exists in the decisioning process. I believe the work I have been doing has substantial implications for a methodological approach in the field of Panetics.

Every decision starts from a perception of what is right in a particular set of circumstances. Based on what is believed to be right, there is usually a series of solutions that comes to mind when a person is confronted by a problem. Relatively quickly--if a problem is one that has been encountered frequently, and dealt with successfully--assumptions are made as to what will probably ensue if the same action policy is adopted. Based on those assumptions, a policy is set and carried out. If new problems arise, more time may be required to assess the proper solution, that is, to determine what is right, what assumptions are fitting, and finally, the most valid solution. This relationship, between values, assumptions and policy, I refer to as VAP.

In all of those instances where the word right is used, what is being reflected--in reality--is a values system. An individual’s perception of right or wrong reflects that person’s values system. Contrary to popular misconception, however, a personal values system is not fixed.

Above, I stated that "Every decision starts from a perception of what is right in a particular set of circumstances." Personal values systems are hierarchical in nature. Decisions that are difficult to make--and take more than the usual amount of time-- are often so because they may necessitate a re-arrangement of the values in a personal Hierarchy of Values--a painful experience. In many such cases, the longer decision time often results from the greater degree of pain being caused by the re-arrangement of values in the hierarchy.

Panetics should foster a methodology of self-analysis that uses the concept of a Panetic evaluation system that positions important decisions within a context of the consequences of the decision.

Fundamentally, a decision ceases to be understood as a self-standing, one-time event. It comes to be seen as part of a system with an epicenter that generates outward circles of suffering and/or happiness.

To what degree does a decision I make create suffering? And is it worthy of the values system I wish to reflect by my actions?

Can we begin to build these sorts of questions into the mind set of individuals? How can we begin to get individuals to evaluate their values hierarchies in terms of the suffering those systems may be causing and about which they have never been aware? Can we begin to develop a means for training children in this approach so they can grow into adulthood as more sensitive individuals? --more aware and more caring-- of the consequences of their actions and decisions? These are goals I believe Ralph Siu would favor as we continue to build on his past efforts.